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Beckett, Wittgenstein and Blanchot:
Language Games from Text to
Theatre
Katy Masuga
1 As often noted by critics, Mercier et Camier, written in 1946 but not published until 1974,
in many ways foreshadows En attendant  Godot (1953)  and includes stylistic  elements
later  found  in  the  trilogy  (Molloy 1951,  Malone  meurt 1951,  L’innommable 1953).  The
parallels  include,  for  example,  the  novel’s  expression  of  futility  of  movement  and
action,  the  curiousness  of  the  characters’  vanishing  and  useless  possessions  and  a
narrative voice that hides, in Curtis Willits’ words, the “imageless image” of the space
of the text (“The Blanchot/Beckett Correspondence” 259). Seemingly coinciding with
Beckett’s so-called revelation in 1945 that affected his perception of the world and the
style  of  his  body  of  work  to  come  (an  idealistically  questionable  but  still  relevant
event),  characterized  in  Krapp’s  Last  Tape (1958,  La  Dernière  Bande 1959),  Mercier  et
Camier, Beckett’s first major work in French, serves as his primary radical expression of
language  play  and  the  significance  of  the  concept  of  silence,  in  a  manner  that
unknowingly  parallels  Wittgenstein and Blanchot’s  contemporaneous philosophy on
the uses and abuses of language.
2 Under  consideration  in  this  analysis  is  Beckett’s  exploitation  of  the  destabilizing
potential  of  a  form  of  theatre  that  implies  the  impossibility  of  full  or  complete
expression.  The  first  of  three  main  points  of  this  article  draws  a  parallel  between
Mercier et Camier and Godot showing how both texts establish a rapport between the
characters and the audience (reader or viewer) that is based on an incompleteness of
expressed language. The second point suggests that Beckett uses language games in a
manner similar to what Wittgenstein and Blanchot discuss in their work in order to
produce  this  effect.  Finally,  the  third  point  considers  Godot as  the  welcome
manifestation of what Beckett first began in Mercier et Camier, but which also gives him
the opportunity to produce a greater effect upon the audience by using the space of the
theatre as live performance.
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3 The late 1940s generally marks a shift in Beckett’s writing, where, notably, he begins to
produce highly condensed works that provide stark and defining images of the human
condition,  which,  in  a  profoundly  implicit  manner,  not  only  fundamentally  point
toward a playfulness in futility but that also place a forceful emphasis on language as
an inherently useless tool for meaningful expression in metaphysics. It is significant to
note, however, that this claim appears to imply that language is an altogether useless
tool, when indeed the contrary is the case. Beckett undermines the basic functioning of
language for the very sake of its possibility. Like Wittgenstein and Blanchot, Beckett
demonstrates an acute aware of the effects of metaphysical inquiry and in exploiting
this gaping, yet often overlooked, hole in language. It is as though the recognition and
acceptance of the flexibility and fallibility of language is itself a revelation (and possibly
a disappointing, or at least destabilizing, and also humorous one), based on the given
assumption that  language can in  some way provide universal  or  meaningful  truths
about the world.
4 In a letter to Axel Kaun dated July 9, 1937, Beckett explains:
Ein Loch nach dem andern in [der Sprache] zu bohren, bis das Dahinterkauernde,
sei es etwas oder nichts, durchzusickern anfängt—ich kann mir für den heutigen
Schriftsteller kein höheres Ziel vorstellen. (514) 
To drill one hole after another into [language] until what is cowering behind, be it
something  or  nothing,  begins  to  leak  out—I  cannot  imagine  a  greater  goal  for
today’s writer. (My translation)
5 Beckett wants to reveal our presumptions about language and to stretch the limits of
what language can do in a literary context. He begins serious exploration of this pursuit
in prose, in Watt and Malloy but also in Mercier et Camier, and eventually finds its most
lucrative expression in the theatre.
6 In  Mercier  et  Camier,  for  instance,  the  “summary”  included  after  each  set  of  two
chapters manages to reduce the already reductive chapters themselves into focused
articulations of the events that occur, thus seemingly stripping out even further any
possible interpretive or analytical meaning from the text. The summary of the final
chapter (twelve in French and eight in English, as the summaries in the French version
are labeled as independent chapters) reads as follows:
La vie de survie.
Camier seul.
Mercier et Watt.




Le pont de l’Ecluse.
Mercier seul.
L’ombre se parfait. (211-212)
The life of afterlife.
Camier alone.
Mercier and Watt.
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Mercier alone.
Dark at its full. (101)
7 The  chapters  in  Mercier  et  Camier are  not  divided,  allowing  the  divisions  that  the
chapter summaries provide to appear meaningful or to have an actual, overtly evident
purpose (as though the summaries are anticipated by the reader). The reader, however,
must then randomly insert mental breaks where the text turns to the next topic, as
indicated in the summary, and to retroactively understand the text in light of these
newly presented divisions.
8 The final chapter begins with Mercier and Camier having just parted. The first quarter
of the chapter has no characters but is  the narrative voice speaking of the general
routine of  a  day and the inherent  fatigue of  life  and its  meaningless  routines.  The
reader is then informed, in the summary at the end, that this description is “the life of
afterlife”, thus connecting the summary directly with the wording in the chapter itself.
Similarly,  the first  sentence of  the short  final  paragraph of  this  last  chapter is  the
following: “Seul il  regarda son ciel s’éteindre, l’ombre se parfaire” (210). (“Alone he
watched  the  sky  go  out,  dark  deepened  to  its  full”  [100]).  In  some  instances  the
connection is evident, as in this one (“dark at its full” and “dark deepened to its full”),
but in others it is made through an inference that the narration forces the reader to
take.
9 The summary design of  listing the  “results”  of  preceding chapters  by  number also
demonstrates  how  Beckett  uses  language  to  engage  the  reader  with  the  words  as
though they are not part of a story but are merely providing objective details. However,
these “details” are meaningless and can themselves be considered to be what Beckett
calls “that something itself”—a phrase used in “Dante ... Bruno. Vico ... Joyce” (1929) to
describe Joyce’s writing: “His writing is not about something; it is that something itself”
(14). Such texts as Joyce’s (according to Beckett) and Mercier et Camier (according to the
present argument) are not describing an idea within the context of the text but are
declaring the text itself as that idea. In A Reader’s Guide to Samuel Beckett (1973) Hugh
Kenner writes: “The difficulties, which are not to be underrated, occur between the
sentences,  or  between  the  speeches”  (10).  Already  in  Mercier  et  Camier Beckett
withholds  from  the  reader  the  idea  of  anything  more  to  the  text  than  its  literal
presence.
10 By reducing, for example, the passages on the everyday at the beginning of the last
chapter to the phrase “the life of afterlife”, any possibility of the text actually being
about “the life of the afterlife” is removed. Instead, the text is immediately about the
reduction  of  the  text  to  a  summary,  rendering  both  the  text  and  the  summary
meaningless in any traditional sense. What is instead revealed—or touched upon—is the
presence of the words and the peculiar relation between the passages in the text and
their summaries, putting the reader in the awkward position of trying to reconcile this
unexpected arrangement of the text.
11 It is clear enough that Beckett’s later work enacts as opposed to describes, but Mercier et
Camier already  works  in  part  toward  this  effect  in  passages,  which  is  particularly
evident in the chapter summaries,  even pointing toward a narratorless speech that
reflects  the  profound  “something  itself”—the  writing  is  no  longer  descriptive  or
explanatory  but  becomes  creation  itself,  with  a  concentration  not  on  any  subject
matter but specifically on the writing. The following exchange between the two title
characters from Mercier et Camier also illustrates.
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Après un moment de silence Camier dit :
Si on s’assoyait, cela m’a vidé.
Tu veux dire s’asseyait, dit Mercier.
Je veux dire s’assoyait, dit Camier.
Assoyons-nous, dit Mercier. (15)
After a moment of silence Camier said:
Let us sit us down, I feel all sucked off.
You mean sit down, said Mercier.
I mean sit us down, said Camier.
Then let us sit us down, said Mercier. (7)
12 The humor of this passage is directly related to a use of language that is both about the
possibility of latent meanings and also not at all about meaning whatsoever. The reader
can first laugh at Camier’s interpretation of the vernacular, but his deadpan insistence
on such an his interpretation simultaneously raises questions for the reader as to other
possible meanings―indeed, including a more conventional one. In this passage Beckett
also demonstrates the very possibility of such an exchange and of Camier’s actually
meaning something that he perhaps shouldn’t mean. Mercier’s direct and perhaps even
confident  concession  deflates  the  reader’s  possible  irritation  with  the  seeming
senselessness of the exchange. That is to say, despite the exchange being apparently
without tremendous meaning, it is presented not only as highly meaningful but rather
as concise, direct and matter-of-fact. The passage is strikingly similar to the exchange
at the end of Godot:
ESTRAGON : Alors, on y va ?
VLADIMIR : Relève ton pantalon. 
ESTRAGON : Comment ? 
VLADIMIR : Relève ton pantalon. 
ESTRAGON : Que j’enlève mon pantalon ? 
VLADIMIR : RE-lève ton pantalon. 
ESTRAGON : C’est vrai.
Il relève son pantalon. Silence. 
VLADIMIR : Alors, on y va ? 
ESTRAGON: Allons-y. 
Ils ne bougent pas. (133-134)
ESTRAGON: Well, shall we go?
VLADIMIR: Pull on your trousers.
ESTRAGON: What?
VLADIMIR: Pull on your trousers.
ESTRAGON: You want me to pull off my trousers?
VLADIMIR: Pull ON your trousers.
ESTRAGON: (Realizing his trousers are down.) True. He pulls up his trousers.
VLADIMIR: Well, shall we go?
ESTRAGON: Yes, let’s go.
They do not move. (88)
13 As with the above passage from Mercier et Camier, the emphasis is not on the action (or
the non-action) but on the lack of obvious connection between the use of the words and
what  they  otherwise  represent.  The  viewer  is  not  only  humored  by  Estragon’s
obliviousness but also surprised by his subsequently peculiar response (“C’est vrai”,
“True”),  which  is,  curiously,  a  precise  yet  slightly  inaccurate  response  within  the
context. Furthermore, as in Mercier et Camier,  “true” is not only taken as the proper
response, but it is also followed by an incomplete concession. (“Shall we go? Yes, let’s
go. They do not move.”) Once again, the reader’s attention is drawn to the language
insofar as it  highlights the characters’  casual acceptance of their own odd behavior
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(e.g.,  to  consider  with  earnestness  pulling  off  one’s  trousers,  to  not  move  when
announcing movement).
14 Despite drawing the attention of Blanchot and other contemporary theorists including
Bataille, Lacan and Adorno, one contemporary of Beckett’s whose ideas are intimately
related  but  with  whom  Beckett  apparently  never  directly  crossed  paths,  is
Wittgenstein. Sounding peculiarly similar to Mercier et Camier and even more to Godot,
the last of the seven tenets of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1921) reads: “Wovon man nicht
sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen.” (“Of that which one is unable to speak,
one must pass over in silence” My translation). Investigating the inherent absurdity in
metaphysical philosophizing, Wittgenstein comes to insist on the necessity of reticence
—by way of  schweigen—to avoid mistakes  in  philosophy when confronted with the
limits  of  language.  In  the  late  1930s  after  a  lengthy  period  of  silence  of  his  own,
Wittgenstein  develops  this  concept  at  length  in  the  Philosophische  Untersuchungen
(Philosophical  Investigations,  posthumous  1953),  with  which Beckett  would  have  been
familiar only later on, stating in a 1961 letter to John Fletcher that he had just very
recently read Wittgenstein (Perloff 134).
15 Schweigen is only awkwardly translated in either English or French (slightly less so in
French, with the reflexive verb se taire), as it simultaneously contains within it a sense
of remaining silent but also the overt activity of being silent and of enacting a state of
silence—an active doing that is also a non-doing (an action that is itself a deliberate
non-action). In Mercier et Camier, Beckett begins to express more visibly a similar theory
through a style of writing that progressively seeks to enact the fundamental structure
of  schweigen,  and  which  leads  him  finally  to  turn  to  the  theatre  to  perform  this
paradoxical communication of silence, exposing our dependency on language despite
its stupefying limits. Generally speaking, Wittgenstein suggests that our sophisticated,
yet  perpetually  inadequate,  metaphysical  reasoning is  not  due  to  lack  of  clarity  or
logical insight but to the misuse of language.
16 With  an  emphasis  on  the  humour  in  paradox,  Wittgenstein’s  language  games  and
Blanchot’s theory on the role of silence in the literary work are both significant to
Beckett’s shift to the theatre. For, despite the possibility of reading Beckett as a nihilist
or even as a negative, anti-literature author, it is important to note the tremendous
longevity and deeply communicative nature of his writing career. Beckett never ceased
writing, attesting to the value he placed not only on art in general and on his craft in
particular, but also on language itself and the power of the word. The question is, then,
how can Beckett’s critics reconcile his apparent love of writing with the content of
writing that seems to suggest, if not the opposite, at least a focus on the incredible
struggle to continue? In setting Beckett in relation to Wittgenstein and Blanchot, the
reader can recognize Beckett’s insistence on an optimistic playfulness in language but a
playfulness that directly concerns the seemingly lacking nature, or lacking possibilities,
in the expression of language.
17 In  Wittgenstein’s  Ladder (1996)  Marjorie  Perloff  includes  a  chapter  on  reading  Watt
through a Wittgensteinian lens, pointing out that most analyses of Watt focus on “the
‘Beckett’ constructed in the Paris of the fifties,” namely, “the chronicler of a postwar,
postatomic world of alienation, emptiness and inevitable despair” (116). Perloff instead
insists  upon  a  reading  that  focuses  on  Beckett’s  interest  in  language  and  in  the
similarity of his prose as reflective of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. She also mentions
Jacqueline Hoefer’s essay “Watt,” which, already in 1959, suggests the possibility that
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Beckett is referring in Watt to Wittgenstein’s famous ladder metaphor in the Tractatus
that  represents  the  understanding  of  language  as  a  (fallible)  tool  and nothing  but.
Wittgenstein claims:  “Er  muss sozusagen die  Leiter  wegwerfen,  nachdem er  auf  ihr
hinaufgestiegen ist” (§6.54). (“He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has
climbed up on it.”) Beckett inserts a curious twist in Watt that has the potential to be
read in a manner consistent with his interest in deliberately misusing language, which
Hoefer contends is directly in alignment with Wittgenstein. The precise passage from
Watt is as follows: “What was changed was existence off the ladder. Do not come down
the ladder,  Ifor,  I  haf  taken it  away” (42).  Beckett,  however,  completely  denies  the
reference to Wittgenstein, claiming his ladder is a reference in an old Irish song. Perloff
denounces Hoefer’s analysis that the curious terms “Ifor” and “I haf” respectively refer
to a type of ladder and a literary rendering of “I have” with a German accent. The
denouncement is not necessarily based on Hoefer’s grammatical conclusions but on her
misunderstanding of Wittgenstein: it  is not a matter of constructing a system to be
mastered and its methodology to subsequently be thrown away (the ladder), but rather
of acknowledging that no such system exists in the first place, revealed through a series
of steps that themselves become useless once this observation is made.
18 Although Perloff  disputes  Hoefer’s  analysis,  the  investigation  into  an  effective  link
between Beckett  and  Wittgenstein  is  well  established  and  remains  highly  relevant.
Perloff’s  personal assessment is that whether or not Beckett is  directly referring to
Wittgenstein, the writers share an affinity in outlook, which is neither metaphysical
nor pessimistic. E. M. Cioran makes the following remark in 1976 of Wittgenstein:
More than once I have found common traits in him and in Beckett. Two mysterious
apparitions, two phenomena that please one by being so baffling, so inscrutable. In
both,  one  and  the  other,  the  same  distance  from  beings  and  things,  the  same
inflexibility, the same temptation to silence, to a final repudiation of words, the
same desire to collide with boundaries never sensed before. (Critical Heritage 379)
19 In response to the manner in which Beckett’s work changed how we understand the
potential of literary language, Deleuze writes in Cinéma I (1983): “Comment nous défaire
de nous-mêmes,  et  nous défaire nous-mêmes?” (97).  (“How can we rid ourselves of
ourselves, and demolish ourselves?” [Cinema I 66]).  By drawing attention to gaps in
reasoning,  Beckett  reveals  the senselessness  in  using language to  philosophize  in  a
manner that disregards les règles du jeu and that subsequently leads to the production
of incomprehensible metaphysical conclusions. Wittgenstein frequently points out that
reasoning errs when it attempts to express in language that which is only knowable
beyond the sensical (things that can only be shown). What is “unsayable”, then, are the
ideas  evolving  from  such  areas  of  thought  as  metaphysics,  ethics  and  aesthetics.
Beckett  draws  out  the  humor  in  such  mistakes  in  reasoning,  creating  interactions
where his characters are often just as disillusioned and confounded by the apparent
shortcomings  of  language—thus  transferring  that  deficiency  onto  the  world  itself,
producing this existential gap in meaning, yet making its obvious connection to (and
dependence upon) language most evident.
20 In “The Prose of Samuel Beckett: Notes from the Terminal Ward” James Atlas writes:
“Beckett verifies Wittgenstein’s claim: ‘Nothing is lost if one does not seek to say the
unsayable.  Instead, that which cannot be spoken is—unspeakably—contained in that
which is said!’” (192). What Beckett reveals by writing nonsense is the “nothing” that
has no quality within language. It cannot be articulated because it is in the realm of the
unsayable  even though it  is  being said.  No articulation can be made about what  is
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“nothing”, because, according to Atlas, “to state what is ˈunsayableˈ is to invent reality
rather than elicit  its  character” (192). Thus,  to state what is  unsayable is  to create
metaphysical truths where, of course, none existence. Beckett aims toward the limits of
language, not toward meaning. He pushes toward the unsayable, exposing not just the
untruth in metaphysical inquiry but the strange pleasure in the paradox of connecting
language  in  unusual  ways.  Straining  to  say  the  unsayable  reveals  perhaps  comical
emptiness, but only in the sense that it is revealing a vacancy that immediately fills
itself with the meaning of the complicated concept of “nothing” in its revelation.
21 Searching in vain,  then,  for a means to comprehend the text through conventional
measures, the reader is left facing a use of language that constantly defies standard
expectations,  ironically through its  casual and often humorous form. In the case of
Mercier et Camier the emphasis is on idiomatic speech, and particularly the French idiom
from the position of a non-native speaker—a technique Beckett later perfects in Godot.
This device draws the reader’s attention to the fact that the narrator is examining each
word as it  is  written and is  hence focusing not on anticipated meaning but on the
staging itself.  In  the  second chapter  just  before  the  summary,  Mercier  and Camier
encounter  two  children.  As  they  call  out  “Papa!”  the  response  is  the  following:
“Bonsoir, mes enfants, dit Mercier, maintenant allez-vous-en” (47). What occurs next in
the text is an unexpected comment by the narrator: “Mais ils ne s’en allèrent point”
(47). (“ˈGood evening, my children, said Mercier, get along with you now.ˈ But they did
not get along with them, no…” [23]). Beckett often refuses to allow expressions to go
unnoticed as the curious alterations in conventional and rule-regulated language that
they are. In the first instance, Mercier uses the reflexive pronoun in the French (and a
prepositional  phrase  with  pronoun  in  English)  to  give  his  command  force:  “vous”
(“with you”). Because of its grammatical presence in the command, this reflection (of
the command: you do this [“go”] with yourself) is kept in the narrator’s response, but
which then has a literal and thus humorous (and possibly destabilizing) effect: in the
narrator’s comment, the presence of the reflexive quality is superfluous but not exactly
ungrammatical, making for an uncertain explanation (with various interpretations) of
what has just occurred. What further complicates this passage is that this statement is
made  by  the  narrator,  thus  estranging  the  reader  even  further  from  a  more
comprehensive connection to the world of the text. It seems Beckett remains resolute
in leaving the reader in the awkward position of not knowing any “full” purpose of
such nuances while fully knowing them through the necessarily complete and haunting
state of incompletion (or perhaps unclarity) of which they are composed.
22 As each example demonstrates,  Beckett does not invent, that is to say, he does not
provide stories for the sake of stories but instead for the sake of showing the possibility
of  peculiar  and  even  entertaining  gaps  in  language.  Beckett  draws  the  reader  and
viewer’s attention to a universal and profound dependency upon language and upon
the idea that language will always necessarily behave as expected. However, Beckett is
also  focusing on the ways in  which we expect  language to  behave even when it  is
contrary to the language game at hand. Such exercises in his work, then, that are often
interpreted through the concept of nonsense, must also be rethought within their own
context. The reader or viewer must ask what this disconnection between performance
and language  suggests  about  this  universal  blind  dependency  on  language.  Beckett
seems to ask his reader or viewer to be wary, not only of the codifications imposed
upon us by language (as Michael Worton suggests in “Waiting for Godot and Endgame:
theatre as text”, for example) but also of making assumptions about the possibilities of
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language. This idea returns the analysis back to Wittgenstein’s insistence of language
games as tools for avoiding mistakes in reasoning―mistakes in language that result in
abstruse  metaphysical  dilemmas.  Indeed,  these  dilemmas  can  even  include  those
readings of Beckett that assume interpretations of the absurd, existential,  symbolic,
and so on.
23 Kenner explains that in reading Beckett “we shall experience the wreckage the story
has left” (9). The language games that Beckett undertakes are like something from a
Marx Brothers  film:  “Je  sens  l’humidité  qui  me rentre  dans  la  raie,  dit  Camier.  Du
moment qu’il n’en sort pas, dit Mercier” (91). (“I feel the damp creeping up my crack,
said Camier. So long as none creeps down, said Mercier” [46]). Although the “joke” is
slightly different in the French and English, the effect is quite the same. Two items are
at work: instead of understanding Camier’s metaphorical language use, and that is to
say, its conventional use (“to creep up”),  Mercier instead interprets it  literally.  The
second point, however, is informed by the first: Mercier is not understanding Camier’s
metaphorical language. In fact, for the joke to take place, the reader would assume that
Mercier  must  in  fact  understand  Camier’s  metaphorical  language  but  deliberately
chooses to respond literally.
24 What this passage demonstrates is once again the play that ensues when language is
torqued beyond its  obvious use.  We expect Mercier to respond to the metaphorical
meaning, since we are aware of the language game that is taking place. When he does
not respond in this way, we are surprised at the text for violating this convention, and
we are also subsequently made aware of language’s imposed limitations as well as its
new possibilities. Beckett makes it clear that the joke is actually on the reader, since it
is only the reader who is aware of what is seen on the page, and it is also the reader
who must accept the text at face value. In this instance, Mercier both does and does not
“understand” Camier’s statement, but all that can be assumed by the reader is that
Camier and Mercier are simply not exactly participating in the same language game.
Or, rather, their subtle misunderstanding produces a different effect from the expected
effect of the language game set out by Camier’s original claim. (And, even then, it is not
really as though a “misunderstanding” exists at all,  as it seems Mercier and Camier
communicate in a manner that both seem to accept and understand.)
25 Wittgenstein  explores  these  kinds  of  issues  in  language  and  language  games
throughout his work. In Über Gewissheit (1969 posthumous, On Certainty), for example,
Wittgenstein  plainly  unravels  G.  E.  Moore’s  argument  from  “Proof  of  an  External
World” (1939),  in  which  Moore  describes  holding  out  his  hand and  declaring  that,
because he knows of the existence of his hand by looking at it in front of him, he knows
as plainly the existence of the external world. Wittgenstein points out, however, that
such an argument is tantamount to Descartes’ metaphysical inquiry of the existence of
God in Discours de la méthode (1637). As Wittgenstein explains, these are arguments that
are  misled  by  an  understanding  that  language  can  do  more  than  show  empirical
propositions;  and,  as  such,  they  attempt  to  show  the  logical  foundations  of  those
propositions and in an empirical manner. This undertaking is an impossibility, since
any act of doubt already rests upon a judgment that a priori indicates doubt is not only
permissible  but necessary  to  evaluate  knowledge.  Wittgenstein  writes:  “Die
Wahrheiten, von denen Moore sagt, er wisse sie, sine solche, die, beiläufig gesprochen,
wir Alle wissen, wenn er sie weiß” (§100) (“The truths which Moore says he knows, are
such as,  roughly speaking,  all  of  us  know,  if  he  knows them”).  A distinction exists
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between saying and showing, such that certain types of propositions (empirical) can
actually say things about the world, whereas others (logical) can only show them, since
it is these latter that inherently and necessarily serve as presupposed principles for
understanding. Where they end is where schweigen begins.
26 As in  direct  response to  Moore,  Über  Gewissheit begins  with Wittgenstein declaring:
“Wenn du weißt, daß hier eine Hand ist, so geben wir dir alles übrige zu” (§1) (“If you
know that here is one hand, we’ll grant you all the rest”). Thus, knowing that there is a
hand is not something that can be proven or explained. It simply is, and using language
correctly,  that is  to say productively,  is  to understand that one’s knowledge of this
hand is not tied up with being able to prove the claim of its existence. However, it is the
nature  of  metaphysical  inquiry  to  raise  doubts,  and  thus  even  propositions  that
logically cannot be doubted indeed become doubted. This undertaking results in effects
that  are  both  disturbing  and  humorous  (e.g.,  Descartes’  dubious  evil  spirit  in  the
former, Beckett’s challenging fiction in the latter).  The following exchange between
Mercier  and Camier is  the epitome:  “As-tu envie  de chanter? dit  Camier.  Pas à  ma
connaissance,  dit  Mercier” (36)  (“Do  you feel  like  singing?  said  Camier.  Not  to  my
knowledge,  said  Mercier” [18]).  Mimicking  (and  mocking)  weighty  epistemological
dialectics, Beckett draws attention to the absurdity in violating what Wittgenstein here
explains very simply:  “Wohl aber läßt sich fragen,  ob man dies sinnvoll  bezweifeln
kann” (§2). (“What we can ask is whether it can make sense to doubt it”.) Because it
can’t and doesn’t make sense to doubt one’s own feeling about an interest in singing or
not, the passage successfully highlights this dual nature in language between empirical
proof and logical form but in a way that is both awkwardly funny and disconcerting.
27 Beckett’s work can also be contextualized in relation to understanding how the theatre
serves  as  a  more  viable  creative  space  for  enacting  the  paradoxical  quality  of
communicative expression through silence. Dissatisfied with the early prose work of
Mercier  et  Camier,  Beckett deliberately did not publish it  until  much later and, even
then, reluctantly. Despite what appears to be evidence in his letters of what he was
attempting with Mercier et Camier, this delay suggests that Beckett did not satisfactorily
achieve the desired literary effect—what he called: “Literatur des Unworts” (“German
Letter to Kaun, 9 July, 1937” 514) (“Literature of the unword” My translation). However,
Beckett  clearly  found  that  strategy  with  Godot via  a  means  more  capable  of
demonstrating the existential  issues of  the impossibilities  of  language.  In Mercier  et
Camier the relation is between the characters and the text. In Godot, it is between the
viewer and the characters, but they achieve the same effect: both draw the reader and
viewer into the unexpected and uncomfortable space where the words no longer stand
for what they typically have stood for and hence into a distancing and questioning of
meaning.
28 On a visit to Dublin from Paris in 1945, Beckett supposedly concluded that his literary
interests should no longer be directed toward trying to gain more about the world and
the attempt to render that in words, as he perceived to be his inherited pursuit from
Joyce.  His  new pursuit  would instead be to  accept  the inherent  impoverishment of
words and, thus, use his creative forces to subtract from the world and to negate the
assumptions  about  it.  In  Damned  to  Fame:  The  Life  of  Samuel  Beckett (1996),  James
Knowlson de-dramatizes the revelatory significance generally given to this event in
popular culture but acknowledges, in any case, that a notable shift did take place in
Beckett’s  style  of  writing  at  this  time,  but  that  it  should  be  attributed to  multiple
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elements including World War II, Beckett’s life-threatening stab wound, his self-exile
and  his  extensive  psychotherapy  treatment  (320).  In  the  brief  essay  “Normandy
Landing”  (2010),  Phyllis  Gaffney  also  notes  in  particular  that  Beckett’s  voluntary
service at the emergency hospital in Saint Lô in Normandy greatly impacted his writing
as well. After this time, Beckett’s focus turned toward the portrayal of lack and the
exploitation of  this  impoverishment  through its  very  physical  manifestation in  the
theatre, which is potentially better equipped for depicting life closer to how it really is:
an actual unfolding of events in space and time.
29 These experiences of the mid-1940s led Beckett to pursue more strongly “the literature
of the unword”—having first developed the concept in the mid-1930s. Beckett describes
this  needed  change  in  full:  “Die  Sprache  da  am besten  gebraucht  wird,  wo  sie  am
tüchtigsten  missgebraucht  wird” (514).  ( “Language  is  used  best  where  it  is  most
efficiently  misused” My  translation.)  Misusing  language  permits  the  hearer  the
opportunity to question the very concept of a correct or true form for meaning and
comprehension.  Such misuse,  or perhaps unordinary use,  opens up new avenues of
thought and creates new possibilities for actualizing unanticipated effects that it can
have on understanding. It was after this time that Beckett took up the theatre, which,
as an active—living, as it were—depiction of the world, subsequently became for him a
form  necessarily  able  to  depict  the  nuances  that  can  manifest  in  the  struggle  to
creatively  manipulate  language.  By  using  a  medium  that  displayed  life  unfolding,
Beckett was able to make that displaying—the staging—itself a source for inquiry. The
production  could  immediately  present  ambiguity  of  meaning  where  meaning  was
otherwise thought to be self-evident. The sequence of events on stage could suddenly
become awkward, foreign, mechanically or arbitrarily joined and no longer be taken for
granted as an inherently meaningful manifestation of a scenario extracted from life.
Ultimately,  the  theatre  could  better  show  its  own  limitations  as  well  as  those  of
language in general.
30 To this end, Beckett’s later works, such as Godot, most clearly toy with the approach of
the  “something  itself”,  coinciding  with  Wittgenstein’s  same  idea  from  the
Philosophische Untersuchungen, where he writes: “Alle Erklärung muß fort, und nur
Beschreibung an ihre Stelle treten” (§109), (“All explanation must be done away with,
and description alone must take its place” My translation). In this sense, “description”
as Wittgenstein uses it may be understood as writing that seeks not to explain or fulfill
a function but for itself to enact a kind of creation of its own, as a form for adding to
the defining or establishing of  things in the world (including itself)  in a  seemingly
superficial or incidental manner. Explanation, on the other hand, is the attempt to get
to the heart of things as though an elaborate uncovering were taking place in the words
—something that Wittgenstein considers impossible. Description, however, implies the
presence of a logical foundation from which to build and the lack of a sense of words as
revelatory.
31 Beckett perfects this Wittgensteinian effect in the theatre where he is suddenly able to
bring the audience closer to the dialogue so that, curiously, a more profound certainty,
and subsequent  estrangement,  occurs.  The  narrator  of  Mercier  et  Camier writes,  for
example :  “Il  recommençait  à  pleuvoir.  Mais  la  pluie  avait-elle  jamais  cessé ?”  (36)
(“The rain was beginning again. But had it ever ceased?” [18]). Again, later in the text,
the question of rain in the story arises, such that the reader cannot be sure if it is really
raining or not. Mercier says to Camier : “Il pleut ferme, à ce qu’il me semble. Tu es
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même tout mouillé” (120) (“It’s coming down, if I am to believe my eyes. Can you not
sense you’re wet?” [60]). Slightly different levels of obscurity between the English and
French, both place significance on the importance or utter unimportance of the details
of  setting.  It  seems  necessary  to  point  out  the  setting,  but  then  its  relevance  is
immediately questioned.  It  is  generally  unclear if  rain is  actually  falling,  but,  more
importantly, it unclear how meaningful such a detail might be. This technique prompts
Beckett’s  reader  ask  him  or  herself:  what  is  worth  reporting,  how  reliable  is  the
reporting and why is it significant? Strong consideration is placed on the characters’
senses. Beckett suggests that Mercier can perhaps mistrust his eyes, but how could he
rightly mistrust the sensation of rain upon his body? This passage leads back to the
distinction, according to Wittgenstein, between the sayable (sagbar), the sensical, and
what is only showable (zeigbar), the metaphysical, ethical and aesthetic.
32 Comparatively, stage directions of the theatre productions obviously allow the scene to
be immediately evident to the viewer, even when they are few or perhaps even vague
(leaving the precise discretion up to the director, actors, and so on, which consequently
still  provides  the  viewer  with  a  full  and  actual  image  on  stage).  The  first  stage
directions of Godot automatically indicate the physical setting: “Route à la campagne,
avec arbre.  Soir” (6)  (“A country road.  A tree.  Evening” [11]).  Since the viewer can
literally  see the scene,  the Verfremungseffekt  of  the ensuing dialogue is  ultimately
more powerful, since the sensory expectation is greater, in terms of being able to enter
the scene and, particularly, of the rapport between the characters (with the removal of
narration). Alternatively, the ambiguity in the prose work must be left as a technique
for keeping the knowledge away from the reader, instead of drawing him or her in as in
the  theatre  performance,  and  shattering  that  access  through  the  possible  surprise
interactions between the characters. In other words, the focus can be upon the specifics
of the staging itself and not simply on not knowing if the details reside in the prose or
in the setting in which it is embedded.
33 An even more obvious example of this effect occurs toward the end of Mercier et Camier
where  the  exchange  involves  an  apparent  (yet  not  evident)  change  of  tone  in  the
characters’ exchange:
Tu ne sais pas où nous allons ? dit Camier.
Qu’est-ce que ça peut nous faire, dit Mercier, où nous allons ? Nous allons, c’est
suffisant.
Ne crie pas, dit Camier. (150-151)
Do you know where we are going? said Camier.
What  does  it  matter,  said  Mercier,  where  we  are  going?  We  are  going,  that’s
enough.
No need to shout, said Camier. (73)
34 The reader must both believe Camier, that Mercier is shouting, but must also believe
nothing, insofar as it is evident at this point in the novel that nothing is what it seems
and that the characters’ dialogues are not only rather meaningless but are generally
misleading  and  unreliable.  Beckett  establishes  and  maintains  this  same
Verfremdungseffekt in the theatre by creating a stage setting that inhibits the viewer
from entering into the space of the world of the piece despite the enticing and obvious
encouragement of the nature of the theatre itself. For example, the setting for Happy
Days,  written first  in English,  (1961,  Oh les  beaux jours 1962),  includes the following:
“Very pompier trompe-l'œil backcloth to represent unbroken plain and sky receding to
meet in far distance” (138). In a letter to Alan Schneider in 1961, Beckett explains that
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he  wanted  this  image  to  represent  “a  pathetic  unsuccessful  realism,  the  kind  of
tawdriness  you  get  in  a  3rd  rate  musical  or  pantomime,  that  quality  of  pompier,
laughably earnest bad imitation” (94). Beckett creates a confounding sense of irony: the
scene gives off an air of failure, of the inability to depict the scene realistically, through
its unexpected presentation of everyday life under incredibly affected circumstances.
Yet of course this effect is deliberate, and in its so-called failure, the scene precisely
commands its own “bad imitation”. This imitation continues to confound the audience,
by both drawing them in with the everyday qualities but estranging them through the
peculiarity of the specific “tawdriness” of the elements of the staging.
35 Similarly,  writing of  the effects of  Beckett’s  plays,  Blanchot says in L’Entretien infini
(1969,  The Infinite  Conversation 1993) :  “Il  faut  renoncer au domaine du visible  et  de
l’invisible, à ce qui se représente, fût-ce négativement. Entendre, seulement entendre”
(482). (“One must renounce the domain of the visible and of the invisible, renounce
what  is  represented,  albeit  in  negative  fashion.  Hear,  simply  hear” (329)).  The
multiplicity  within the concept  “entendre” points  both toward the curious  state  of
hearing  silence  and  toward  literal  and  figurative  senses  of  hearing,  which  in  turn
reconfirm the significance of the theatre as the literal space where entendre can be
expressed more directly  (and even visually).  Figuratively,  the visible  can no longer
stand for a projection of reality in Beckett. At the same time, the visible can be nothing
other than representation precisely because it is literally appearance. For this reason,
Beckett’s appeal to the invisible―to what is possible beyond appearances―becomes a
play with the senses. For, if the scene on stage simultaneously means both more and
less than its overt depiction (more insofar as it demonstrates that it is not restricted to
a representational meaning precisely through it’s being less than expected, less than
realistic), the viewer must rely on the other senses to do the explaining and find an
understanding.  More  precisely,  if  Beckett  asks  his  viewer  to  disallow any  standard
meaning of the image on stage, it becomes, as Blanchot says, a matter of sound instead
of sight.
36 Silence, then, can take on a new significance by becoming a powerful indicator of an
action  taking  place  in  contradistinction  to  what  is  not  taking  place  (speaking,
communicating and so on). For example, the inserted stage directions and director’s
notes of “silence” in Godot exemplify the weight of schweigen that is more possible in
theatre than prose. Toward the end of Act I, Pozzo behaves as though he is engaged in
an  exchange  with  Estragon  and  Vladimir  but  which  is  more  of  a  nonsensical
monologue, where he suddenly asks (though no one has spoken): “Vous dites? (Silence.)
Peut-être n’avez-vous rien dit ? (Silence.) C’est sans importance” (37-38). (“I beg your
pardon? (Silence.)  Perhaps you didn’t  speak? (Silence.)  It’s  of  no importance” [29].)
Beckett uses the theatre to provide a visceral space that noticeably marks the absurdity
of asking questions in silence or, perhaps, of indifferently receiving no answers but
only silence. The difference is in the performance of Godot, such that silence is made
evident through its very presence and not simply through the reading of its existence.
The viewer literally encounters the silence.
37 In the general stylistic shift from the form of Mercier et Camier as a novel to the theatre
of  Godot,  performance  as  non-performance  already  becomes  central,  announcing
specifically that the piece no longer tells the story, but rather the story can only ever
insufficiently be told. A parallel can easily be drawn between the two works and the
two sets of characters that allows a comparison between prose and script to be more
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readily and carefully observed. This exercise leads to a recognition of the efforts of
both works to achieve silence and “nothing”, while also indicating the greater success
of Godot at this endeavor. The well-known critique of Godot in 1956 by Vivian Mercier
elucidates:
Its  author  has  achieved  a  theoretical  impossibility—a  play  in  which  nothing
happens,  that  yet  keeps  audiences  glued  to  their  seats.  What's  more,  since  the
second act is a subtly different reprise of the first, he has written a play in which
nothing happens, twice. (“The Uneventful Event” 95)
38 The key to this shift toward “nothing” as performed in the theatre rests in Beckett’s
interest in showing, as evidently as possible (thus, indicating the already fundamental
necessity of the transformation from prose to theatre) not necessarily a nihilistic view
of the world but the paradoxical nature of existence within language, which can only be
made evident by means of the very deliberate and visual absence of ordinary action and
in the empty space of vigorous, active silence.
39 In  “Peintres  de  l’Empêchement”  (1948),  Beckett  wonders :  “Car  que  reste-t-il  de
représentable si l’essence de l’objet est de se dérober à la représentation ?” (136). (For,
what  is  it  that  remains  representable  if  the  essence  of  the  object  is  to  evade
representation?  My  translation.)  He  then  also  provides  the  answer :  “Il  reste  à
représenter les conditions de cette dérobade” (136). (“The conditions of this evasion
remain to be represented” My translation.) Using prose as his first means to confirm
his ontological response, Beckett attempts to establish an existential space between the
text  and  the  reader  in  Mercier  et  Camier—indeed,  the  question  of  writing  and
representation itself  lay dormant in the text,  which preceded the above-mentioned
essay by several years. Dissatisfied, however, and perhaps uncertain, Beckett left the
manuscript unpublished and moved on to the trilogy where he hoped to engage his
response more effectively. Yet, not until Beckett began to write theatre would he be
fully capable of developing a satisfactory illustration of his response to that nagging
impossibility of a dérobade. The theatre permits Beckett to bring the reader—that is to
say, now the viewer or the audience—into the space of the performance, which, for
Beckett, becomes the space of non-action, of “nothing”. In this way, Beckett attempts
to get closer to the limits of language.
40 In  the  section entitled  “La  voix  narrative” (“The Narrative  Voice”)  from L’Entretien
infini, Blanchot writes that the narrative voice exists as though in a sort of background,
and it  is  this “in back” (380) (“en arrière” 557) that can serve as the space for the
seemingly impossible distance that language needs in order to demonstrate its limit.
Blanchot writes : “Se tenir dans le langage, c’est toujours déjà être au dehors” (557).
(“To hold oneself in language is to be always already outside” [380].) However, language
itself already forces the so-called limit to be unlimited by the limitless quality that is
language  itself.  He  begins  this  chapter  with  a  metaphor  that  immediately  recalls
Beckett and his “literature of the unword”: “On fait quelques pas dans la rue, on en fait
huit ou neuf, puis l’on tombe. La limite qu’indique la fatigue limite la vie” (556). (“You
take a few steps on the street, eight or nine, then you fall. The limit set by weariness
limits life” [379].) As though a simultaneously direct and indirect reference to Beckett,
Blanchot  suggests  that  not  only  is  language  insufficient  for  “explanation” (as
Wittgenstein would say), but that insufficiency actually limits, most literally, physical
life as well. It sets Beckett’s stage into states of absurdity, where movement itself is
called  into  question—where  all  action  and  meaning  is  completely  undermined  and
stripped down to silence.
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41 Blanchot then adds to this Beckettian image the following claim: “Le langage modifie la
situation” (556). (“Language modifies the situation” [379].) This is because, of course,
language inhibits but also permits expression. It creates the impossible by providing a
system that  can never  fulfill  its  promise  of  wholly  explaining its  own existence  or
anything else. Blanchot writes : “La phrase que je prononce tend à attirer à l’intérieur
même de la vie la limite qui ne devrait  la marquer que de l’extérieur” (556).  (“The
sentence I pronounce tends to draw into the very inside of life the limit that was only
supposed to mark it from the outside” [379].) Language draws back into life the limit
that life seemed to be expressing; it unlimits the very limit that it establishes.
42 Widespread throughout Blanchot’s  work (Faux pas 1943,  L’Espace littéraire 1955),  this
idea is also found readily enough across Beckett’s entire oeuvre as well (e.g., Murphy
1938, the trilogy and Godot) and is also then taken further by both figures. Significantly,
it is this philosophical next step that Beckett employs in his later work that reflects a
phenomenological  shift  in  his  approach  to  getting  at  the  unword  in  his  language-
centered  text—both  in  prose  and  theatrical  form.  What  the  next  step  entails  is
recognizing the space between the writing and the reader. In L’Entretien infini Blanchot
says : “Ecrire c’est passer du ˈjeˈ  au ˈilˈ” (558). (“To write is to pass from ˈIˈ  to ˈheˈ”
[380].) It is this transference of the writer into the narrator at the moment of writing
that signifies one of the greatest breakthroughs in Beckett’s work as begun in Mercier et
Camier and most fully expressed in Godot.  At the moment of writing,  the words are
suddenly no longer pre-text ideas, or even pre-text words belonging to the writer, but
they have become part of the world, part of the system of language and hence part of
the immediate fictional text, perpetually beyond the writer and out of reach of any
complete meaning.
43 Beckett affinities with Wittgenstein and Blanchot extend toward their perception of the
use and limitations of language, using shared philosophical concepts to effect in his
work, with the chapter summaries of Mercier et Camier serving as a notable example.
Such pronouncements defy literary expectations by pointing not away from the text
toward interpretative meaning but toward themselves as somehow unavailable to such
analysis.  reportage of nonsense and of the gaps in language, and for this reason he
turns to the theatre for a fuller means for expression.
44 As  shown  with  Mercier  et  Camier,  Beckett  begins  his  writing  career  intent  on
approaching  and  expressing  the  fallible  nature  of  the  text  and  of  language,  and,
because he ultimately wants to strip even the language quality out of  language,  he
moves  toward  theatre  and  creates  Godot and  other  works  that  struggle  to  extract
silence out of language. Yet, Beckett of course cannot strip out language at any cost,
because  it  is  already  and  only  through  language  that  the  limits  of  language  are
expressed.  The  effort  becomes one,  then,  of  perpetually  searching for  the  invisible
silence that does not exist in words. The making of silence that permeates Beckett’s
work will always necessarily still be about the text, even in the text of the theatre. For
Blanchot,  this  paradoxical  effort  in language that  is  transmitted in Beckett’s  works
exemplifies the perpetual pursuit of the ephemeral concept of the sound of silence,
focusing on the “sound” component―on the production, on the audience, namely on
entendre. For Wittgenstein, Beckett’s unknowing critic, this search takes the form of
schweigen,  focusing  on  the  “silence”  component―on  the  strangeness  of  speech  to
illustrate silence. Indeed, it  is  both the listening to and speaking about silence that
makes Beckett’s work rich, playful and unceasingly enigmatic.
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ABSTRACTS
Beckett’s first major work in French, Mercier et Camier, written in 1946 but not published until
1974, in many ways foreshadows En attendant Godot (1953) and includes stylistic elements later
found  in  the  trilogy  (Molloy 1951,  Malone  meurt 1951,  L’innommable 1953).  Mercier  et  Camier
represents Beckett’s first radical encounter with nihilism and absurdity in relation, specifically,
to language play in a Wittgensteinian and Blanchotian sense. In this stylistic shift from the form
of  Mercier  et  Camier as  a  novel  to  the  theatre  of  En  attendant  Godot,  performance  as  non-
performance  becomes  central,  announcing  that  the  spectacle  no  longer  tells  the  story,  but,
rather, the story can only ever insufficiently be told. This article focuses on the significance of
silence  and language  in  Beckett’s  transition toward the  theatre,  paying specific  attention to
possible  intertextual  relations  with  Wittgenstein  and  Blanchot  and  the  significant  overlap
between their work concerning the impossible role of language and writing the self.
Le premier roman propre de Beckett en français, Mercier et Camier (écrit en 1946 mais publié en
1974) préfigure d’une certaine manière En attendant Godot (1953) et comporte des éléments du
style trouvés plus tard dans la trilogie (Molloy 1951, Malone meurt 1951, L’innommable 1953). Mercier
et  Camier représente la  première rencontre radicale  de Beckett  avec le  nihilisme en rapport,
spécifiquement,  avec  le  jeu  du  langage  dans  un  sens  de  Wittgenstein  et  Blanchot.  Dans  son
changement stylistique de la forme de Mercier et Camier comme roman au théâtre d’En attendant
Godot, le concept de la représentation comme non-représentation devient central, annonçant que
le  spectacle  ne  dit  plus  l’histoire,  mais  plutôt  que  l’histoire  ne  peut  qu’être  insuffisamment
racontée. Cet article se concentre sur l’importance du silence et du langage dans la transition de
Beckett au théâtre, en prêtant une grande attention aux relations intertextuelles possibles avec
Wittgenstein et Blanchot et le lien considérable entre leurs œuvres, concernant le rôle impossible
du langage et l’écriture de soi.
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